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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to review and analyse the WTO procedures and rules designed to 
resolve developing countries disputes. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the 
World Trade Organization is generally considered as providing innovative set of rules through 
which countries could address and resolve trade disputes amongst themselves. The DSU also 
establishes an Advisory Centre, which seeks to assist developing countries to resolve trade 
disputes. Despite these innovations, opinions are divided on the practical effectiveness of the 
DSU and the Advisory Centre, particularly with respect to resolving disputes involving 
developing countries. In this paper, we shall examine the practical effectiveness of DSU and 
the roles of the Advisory Centre in the dispute resolution processes involving developing 
countries.  
Drawing examples from previous disputes, some practical challenges and constraints 
with the current procedures faced by developing countries are identified and discussed; they are: 
lack of expertise, inability to enforce WTO rulings, reluctance to institute trade disputes and 
economic pressure applied by developed countries on developing countries in trade disputes 
amongst others. Addressing these challenges are critical to the overall success of the DSU. 
This paper calls for a review of the DSU to incorporate the reforms enunciated by various 
stakeholders to the WTO. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international body set up in 1995 
with the principal aim of liberalizing trade by reducing imminent trade 
obstacles and ensuring that a level playing field is obtained. It provides a legal 
and institutional framework for the implementation and monitoring of 
agreements, as well as for settling disputes arising from their interpretation and 
application.1 The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), a 
purposeful system of dealing with international trade disputes, came into being 
as a result of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Uruguay 
round of negotiations.  These negotiations took place between the years of 
1986 to1994. It has been argued that the WTO DSU is one of the most 
outstanding outcomes of the Uruguay round.2 WTO principles are largely 
based on the GATT provisions and it is the principal rule–book on matters 
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concerning: trade in goods, trade in services, relevant aspects of intellectual 
property, dispute settlement and trade policy reviews.3  
This paper analyses the position of developing countries in the Dispute 
Settlement System (DSS) in the WTO. The DSS is a highly legalized and 
judicialized process of resolving or settling trade disputes among member-
countries of the WTO. Many developing countries are members of the WTO 
and the DSS is said to promote justice and equality among the developing and 
developed countries when settling trade disputes. By 2008, nearly 400 disputes 
had been brought before the dispute settlement system and almost 300 rulings 
(including panel and Appellate Body reports and arbitration awards) had been 
issued.4 In 2012, the number had increased from 400 to 452 dispute cases.5 
This paper will aver that notwithstanding the participation of developing 
countries in trade dispute settlement, the DSS has not actualised hopes and 
aspirations of its founding fathers towards developing countries. 
The first part of the paper will be the introduction. The second part of 
the paper will focus on the history of the WTO and its metamorphosis from 
the GATT. Also, dispute settlement under GATT will be in focus. The third 
part of the paper will dwell on the dispute settlement under the WTO. The 
fourth part of the paper will focus on developing countries and the WTO 
system. Here, the paper will attempt to answer the conundrum inherent in the 
WTO and its impacts on the dispute settlement involving developing 
countries. The final part of the paper will advocate reforms to improve dispute 
settlement in WTO. 
                     
2. HISTORY OF THE GATT/WTO  
The WTO came into existence in 1995. It is the successor to General 
Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and is the legal and institutional 
foundation of the international trading system; it was created by the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO Agreement). Unlike 
GATT, WTO is an international organisation. However, the GATT is 
subsumed under the WTO Agreement. Thus, GATT ended up being a 
document without any institution for its administration. 
The GATT had its origins in the still-born International Trade 
Organisation.6 Due to the devastating effects of the Second World War, world 
leaders began to nurse the idea of a world trade body.7 During negotiations of 
the International Trade Organisation provisions, the GATT was signed at 
Geneva in 1947.8 The intention was that GATT would be absorbed into the 
ITO9, GATT was supposed to be a temporary agreement pending when the 
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ITO would come into legal existence. Some countries could not wait for the 
completion of the different legislative approvals needed for the ITO to 
become effective, they agreed to apply GATT provisionally as of January1, 
1948.10 Thus, GATT was a child of necessity and an impromptu agreement.  
                  
Dispute Settlement in GATT 
The basic goal of GATT was to promote free international trade by 
establishing rules that limited national trade impediments.11 According to 
Hudec12, the sole dispute machinery in GATT was the “nullification and 
impairment” provision dating from the Geneva draft of the ITO. 
Early dispute settlement was highly diplomatic and the process was 
referred to as “conciliation”.13 Dispute settlement in GATT involved members 
protesting measures taken by another member to provide certain of its 
industries with special protection or advantages that interfere with international 
trade.14 The General Agreement contained a lot of provisions designed to 
resolve trade disputes between its contracting parties.15 The primary provision 
regulating dispute settlement in GATT was Article XXIII. This provision was 
normally resorted to when a member claims that it has suffered loss as a result 
of another member who had its benefit nullified or impaired.16 Article XX111:2 
of GATT 1947 provided that the contracting parties themselves, acting jointly, 
had to deal with any dispute between individual contracting parties.17                                                                                            
Earlier in GATT, parties to a dispute were also members of the panel 
to decide the case. Subsequently, parties directly involved in the disputes were 
dropped and neutral parties were appointed into a three or five member 
panels. However, these panels were populated by diplomats instead of lawyers 
versed in international trade law. Thus, “legal rulings were drafted with an 
elusive diplomatic vagueness”.18 A panel’s decision would be referred to the 
contracting parties (GATT council) and if approved by it, becomes binding on 
the parties. Flowing from the above, dispute settlement under Articles XXII 
and XXIII arguably provided for a system of rudimentary dispute settlement 
procedures and the process was not ‘judicialized’ or ‘legalized’ (unlike the 
WTO). Dispute settlement in GATT had no enforcement mechanisms and 
the legality of the rulings “is up to the disputant states themselves”.19 
A major flaw in GATT was that it was a multi-party contract and any 
decision to amend, modify or interpret it needed the consent of all the 
parties.20 This was referred to as ‘Positive Consensus’ in GATT, when a panel 
report is brought to the contracting parties for approval, the losing party can 
‘block’ it. This is done by refusing to assent to the report, and if a party blocks 
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a report, based on the consensus rule, the report would not be adopted. Losing 
parties took advantage of it, by using the consensus rule to stop the 
establishment of a panel and to guard against unfavourable panel reports. 
Other flaws21 in the GATT included secrecy in its dispute settlement process, 
rulings were easy to block and no fixed timetables for resolving disputes 
amongst others.  
As a result of this and other defects in the GATT, the WTO was 
formed. 
 
Review of Dispute Settlement in the WTO 
A trade dispute arises in the WTO when one country adopts a trade policy 
measure or takes some action that another country considers to be against the 
WTO agreements.22 In essence:  
 
…disputes in the WTO are essentially about broken promises. 
WTO members have agreed that if they believe fellow-members 
are violating trade rules, they will use the multilateral system of 
settling disputes instead of taking action unilaterally. That means 
abiding by the agreed procedures, and respecting judgements.23  
 
Here, the dispute settlement process in the WTO was meant to 
promote fairness and equality and sustainable development towards the 
developing countries. The dispute settlement process changed from diplomatic 
to a legalized process and from power-based to rule-based procedure.24 
Dispute settlement is the central pillar of the multi-lateral trading 
system, and WTO’s unique contribution to the stability of the world economy. 
A major difference between the GATT and WTO is that WTO has a new 
body called Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB is an assembly 
consisting of all the members of the WTO of all the members of the WTO. It 
was created during the Uruguay Round of negotiations to deal with any dispute 
arising from WTO agreements and this done in line with the provisions of the 
‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes’, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).25 The DSB has 
authority to create dispute settlement panels, to adopt panel and appellate body 
reports, to maintain surveillance of the implementation of the rulings, it can 
also authorise retaliations if the rulings are not adhered to by virtue of Article 
2.1 of the DSU. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is composed of 
27 Articles and 4 Appendices. It covers agreements which include: the WTO 
Agreement, its multilateral trade agreements for goods, the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and four plurilateral trade agreements 
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which cover Civil Aircraft, Government Procurement, Dairy and Bovine 
Meat.26 There are also special or additional applications of the DSU rules.27 
The Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the WTO comprises of the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the Dispute Settlement Panels (DSP) and the 
Appellate Body (AB). The DSB could be regarded as a political institution 
within the WTO; while the DSP and AB are the judicial-type of institutions.28  
 
Trade disputes are settled among WTO member countries through the 
following methods:  
i. Consultation/Negotiation between Parties: If a WTO Member 
requests consultations with another Member under a WTO 
agreement, the latter Member must enter into consultations 
with the former within 30 days. If the dispute is not resolved 
within 60 days, the complaining Member may request a 
panel.29 
ii. Good offices, Conciliation and Mediation: This is a voluntary 
procedure that is undertaken where the parties to the dispute 
agree to it. Proceedings and the position taken by the parties 
are confidential and without prejudice to the rights of either 
party in any further proceeding.30 
iii. Arbitration: This is a suitable method of settling disputes 
where the relevant issues for determination are clearly 
defined by both parties.31 Arbitrators are selected by the 
parties to the arbitration or, if they cannot agree on an 
arbitrator, the Director-General may appoint one on their 
behalf. 
iv. Adjudication by Panels and the Appellate Body: The request for a 
panel must be made in writing; identifying the specific 
measure at issue and giving a brief but clear summary of the 
complaint sufficient to present the problem.32 Once the panel 
is constituted, it hears written and oral arguments from the 
disputing parties. After a careful consideration of these 
presentations, a descriptive part of its report (facts and 
argument) is issued to the disputing parties. Following a 
review period, a final report is issued to the disputing parties 
and later passed around to all WTO Members.33 
v. Implementation and enforcement of the recommendations and rulings 
adopted by the DSB: Where a WTO decision finds a defending 
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29 Article 4, Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
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member in violation of an obligation under a WTO 
agreement, the member must inform the DSB of its 
implementation plans within 30 days after the panel report 
and any AB report are adopted. If it is ‘impracticable’ to 
comply immediately, the Member will have a ‘reasonable 
period of time’ to do so. 
Classification of Countries in the WTO 
There are three classifications of countries in the WTO. They are the 
‘developed’ ‘developing’ and ‘least developed’ countries (the developing and 
least developed countries are sometimes placed in one category). There is 
currently no strict definition of either class of countries at the moment. Thus, 
there are no yardsticks for these classifications of countries into the various 
groups. The term ‘developing country’ has been argued to be “an ambiguous 
one and does not clearly differentiate between those who are more likely to use 
the WTO system”.34   
The selection or categorisation is made when members announce for 
themselves whether they are ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ countries; the status is 
based on self-declaration. One benefit of the above classification is that 
countries with similar interests can band together to promote their interests in 
the WTO and the classification can be a unifying factor for such countries. 
However, the mere fact that a WTO member announces itself to be a 
developing country does not automatically mean that it will benefit from the 
preference schemes available. In practice it is the preference giving country 
(usually a developed nation), which decides the list of developing countries that 
will benefit from the preferential treatment. 
Furthermore, in comparison with the GATT, it has been posited that 
developing countries fare better under the WTO DSS thus: 
 
...because the WTO is a rule-based system and not a power-
based system. It is generally accepted that a rule-based system 
with a quasi-judicial dispute settlement system serves the 
interests of developing countries, least-developed countries 
(LDCs) and small economies better.35 
 
Under the GATT, very few developing countries were GATT 
contracting parties, thus many were free to “engage in protectionist, trade-
restricting and import-substituting policies”36 amongst other economic policies. 
Some scholars aver that many developing countries and LDCs have been 
short-changed by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.37 Thus, this view is 
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that very few developing countries have benefited from the WTO DSS. Hence, 
the African Group38 in the WTO posits that:  
Experience has shown that the [dispute settlement system] has not 
satisfactorily and clearly aimed in its operation to contribute towards the 
tangible attainment of the development objectives of the WTO Agreement.39A 
number of countries have declared themselves to be developing countries. 
Prominent amongst them are; Pakistan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and South 
Africa.40 In terms of written submissions, some active developing countries 
within the WTO include: China, India, Egypt, Brazil, Kenya and Argentina41 
Developing countries account for more than two thirds of the total number of 
countries in the WTO.42 
Over the years, the developing country status has led to controversy. In 
the US–Steel Safeguard dispute China did not expressly declare her developing 
country status in her Accession protocol.43 This led to ambiguity on the 
appropriate WTO procedure to utilize.44 Similarly upon adoption of the Panel 
and AB reports in the Korea – Beef Case, the European Union stated that it 
did not consider it appropriate for Korea to be considered a developing 
country for the purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture.45 The developing 
country status was also considered at the conclusion of the Uruguay round. 
During the negotiations, the United States tightened measures on the use of 
subsidies by foreign governments. It declared that it would no longer consider 
certain Members to be developing countries for purposes of subsidies or 
countervailing duty investigations.46  The controversies resulted in a 
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39 Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Proposal by the African Group, 
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Borght (n 35) 790 
40  George Bermann & Petros Mavroidis  Columbia Studies in WTO Law and Policy: WTO Law and 
Developing Countries (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2007) 161 -162 
41 Hakan Nordstrom, ‘Participation of developing countries in the WTO – new evidence based 
on the 2003 official records’ 
<http://www.noits.org/noits06/Final_Pap/Hakan_Nordstrom.pdf> accessed 30 November 
2012. Also as of March 2013, the WTO currently has 159 countries as members. See WTO 
Members and Accession Candidates, August 2012 at 
<www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/members_brief_e.doc> accessed 30 July  2013 
42  Jan Bohanes and Fernanda Garza, ‘Going Beyond Stereotypes: Participation of Developing 
Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement’ 4 (1) (2012) TLD 51  
43 World Trade Organization - Dispute Settlement, Dispute DS252: ‘United States – Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds252_e.htm> accessed 30 
November 2012  
44 WTO, Accession of the People’s Republic of China (2001) 
<http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/chinaaccessionprotocol.pdf> accessed 30 November 
2012 
45 World Trade Organization - Dispute Settlement, Dispute DS161: ‘Korea  - Measures 
Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef ‘ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds161_e.htm> accessed 30 
November 2012  
46 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures <http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/uraa/saa-
cv.html > accessed 30 November 2012   
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compilation by Horn of the WTO Membership into 5 groups.47 These five 
groups are the European Union and United States; Brazil, India, and China; 
Other Industrialized Countries: including Korea, Mexico, Singapore, and 
Turkey; Developing Countries and Least Developed Countries.               
                       
Privileges Enjoyed by Developing Countries in the WTO 
There are key provisions in the WTO, which arguably promote the 
favourable treatment of developing countries. These provisions grant them 
privileged rights called: ‘Special and Differential treatment’ (S&D). It is 
important to examine these provisions in order to appropriately understand the 
position of developing countries in the WTO. Developing countries enjoy 
exclusive concessions in three ways: 
• WTO Agreements: They contain special provisions for developing 
countries: The Committee on Trade and Development: Focuses on 
Trade and Development, and also deals debt and technology transfer. 
• The WTO Secretariat: The Secretariat provides Technical Assistance 
(mainly training of various kinds) to developing countries. 
Other incentives put in place by the WTO to encourage developing country 
participation are; 
• Extra time to fulfill commitments: After a successful dispute resolution, 
developing countries are given extra time to fulfil their commitments 
and obligations. 
• Provisions designed to increase trading opportunities: Through greater market 
access, trading opportunities are increased by breaking barriers to trade 
in areas like textiles, services, and technical barriers to trade. 
• Provisions requiring WTO members to safeguard the interests of developing 
countries: WTO members are enjoined to adopt meaningful domestic 
and international measures in areas such as anti-dumping that will 
safeguard the interest of developing countries. 
• Provisions for various means of helping developing countries: These 
commitments focus on specific areas including; animal and plant health 
standards, technical standards, and other provisions aimed at 
strengthening their domestic telecommunications sectors. 
• Legal assistance: The WTO Secretariat has special legal advisers for 
assisting developing countries in any WTO dispute and for giving them 
legal counsel. The service is offered by the WTO’s Training and 
Technical Cooperation Institute.  
• The Advisory Centre on WTO Law: In 2001, 32 WTO governments set up 
an Advisory Centre on WTO law. Its members consist of countries 
contributing to the funding, and those receiving legal advice. All least-
developed countries are automatically eligible for advice. Other 
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developing countries and transition economies have to be fee-paying 
members in order to receive advice.  
3. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN 
THE WTO 
It has been argued that the successful use of the WTO dispute settlement rests 
on the meaningful organization and collaboration among various governmental 
agencies as well as between the public and private sectors.48 In other words, the 
decision to pursue a case at the WTO lies predominantly with the governments 
of member states. The government is charged with the onerous task of 
selecting a case, evaluating whether it will be worth going forward with and 
thereafter managing the litigation process. Therefore, information is a key 
requirement and embodies a considerable part of the litigation costs for 
initiating a WTO dispute.49 Davis supports this view and opines that a large 
amount of the case specific information is provided by the affected domestic 
industry and legal advisors. There are fixed costs that are a function of 
experience; these include a building knowledge of WTO rules and procedures 
in both government and industry circles and establishing institutional processes 
to facilitate participation in dispute settlement.50 The member countries that 
face the most difficulties in meeting coordination challenges are the developing 
countries.51 Primarily these challenges occur due to their lack of experience and 
also their failure to prioritise litigation coordination.52 
In determining whether the WTO DSS has been effective in resolving 
the trade disputes of developing countries, it is pertinent to examine two 
significant arguments that have been put forward. The first argument posits 
that the WTO procedure has been adequate and effective in settling disputes. 
The second argument postulates that there are challenges in the DSS which 
deter developing countries from participating in the process. We will now 
address the two arguments. 
 
Strengths o f  the WTO Dispute Set t l ement Process  involv ing Developing 
Countr ies  
It is contended that the DSS has been highly effective in settling disputes and 
has improved trade relations between developing countries and other member 
states to a large extent. This argument is primarily pivoted on the fact that 
countries ‘learn by doing’. When developing countries are ‘repeat players’, they 
acquire relevant knowledge on how the process works and thereby improve 
institutional arrangements for coordination of public and private action to 
address trade problems.53 
The WTO experience of Pakistan exemplifies this. The first case filed 
by Pakistan as a sole complainant was against the United States regarding a 
transitional safeguard measure on combed cotton yarn from Pakistan (US - 
                                                
48 Gregory Shaffer  and Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz ‘Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The 
Developing Country Experience’ (ICTSD 2012 
49 Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis ‘WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and 
Surveillance’ [2000] TWE 1 
50 Christina Davis and Sarah Bermeo, ‘Who Files? Developing Country Participation in 
GATT/WTO Adjudication’ 71 (2009) JOP 1036 
51 Shaffer and Melendez-Ortiz (n 48) 
52 ibid  
53 Davis and Bermeo (n 50) 1036 
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Cotton Yarn).54 Prior to this time Pakistan had filed two cases under the 
GATT and joined a WTO case with multiple complainants.55 At the time of 
filing the dispute, Pakistan did not have an effective institutional framework 
within the Ministry of Commerce, which could deal with WTO–related dispute 
settlement cases. However during the course of the dispute, WTO sections in 
the permanent mission in Geneva and the Ministry of Commerce were set up; 
as well as a 13-member high-level WTO council chaired by the Minister of 
Commerce.56 The Cotton Yarn Case was successfully resolved in Pakistan’s 
favour. In 2005 Pakistan filed another case against Egypt regarding anti-
dumping duties on matches; this case was also concluded in Pakistan’s favour.57 
Pakistan has participated in several cases as a third party and also has cases 
currently under consideration as potential complaints. The serving Ambassador 
to the WTO for Pakistan in 2008 elaborated on the advantages accruing to 
Pakistan due to its involvement in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
He posited thus: 
 
It is encouraging when we get positive results so we are more 
likely to see dispute settlement as an effective strategy. We know 
about the selection of lawyers and how to enter consultations. If 
it were the first time we would be completely lost but if we have 
experience it helps …58  
 
The classic experience of Costa Rica is another example of how the 
WTO DSS has adequately resolved the trade dispute of developing countries. 
Costa Rica challenged the United States on the use of transitional safeguard 
provisions for cotton underwear (US - Underwear Case).59 At the time the 
complaint was filed, foreign affairs officials were reluctant to proceed with the 
                                                
54 World Trade Organization – Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS192 ‘United States – 
Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds192_e.htm>, accessed 11 
December 2012 
55 World Trade Organization – Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS58 ‘United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm>, accessed 11 
December 2012  
56 World Trade Organization : ‘Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation, Case Study 34, 
Turab Hussain’  
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case34_e.htm> accessed 11 
December 2012, also relevant, Turab Hussain, ‘Combed Cotton Yarn Exports of Pakistan to 
the United States: A Dispute Settlement Case’ (2005) 05-35, LUMS 
<http://cmer.lums.edu.pk/upload/CMER_05_36.pdf > accessed 11 December 2012 
57 World Trade Organization – Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS327 ‘Egypt – Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Matches from Pakistan’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds327_e.htm> accessed 12 
December 2012 
58 Comment by Dr. Manzoor Ahmad, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO 
for Pakistan in an interview by Davis and Bermeo, Geneva, 30 June 2008 cited in  Davis and 
Sarah (n 50) 1037 
59 World Trade Organization – Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS24  ‘United States Restriction 
on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear’ 




matter because they did not want to harm relations with the United States.60 
However, trade ministry officials insisted that the case was necessary to show 
evidence of a transparent, unbiased system and to maintain the benefits of 
open trade under the WTO for domestic industries. Costa Rica, despite its 
concerns about ‘testing the system’ alone, used the mechanisms available to it 
as a WTO member to ensure that important principles of the multilateral 
trading system were appropriately applied.61 The ‘system’ worked as intended 
in this case. Almost ten years after the dispute, both developed and developing 
countries regularly use the DSU process. This case, as an early test of the 
system, clearly points to some lessons.62 Anabel Gonzales of the Costa Rican 
legal team identified one lesson: ‘… never underestimate a trade conflict. Pay 
attention to it from the beginning and throughout the process.’ The United 
States probably underestimated both Costa Rica’s resolve and its capacity to 
prosecute the case. While the other countries identified by the United States as 
posing a threat to its underwear industry quickly agreed to settle with the 
United States, Costa Rica did not. The victory in the cotton case opened the 
door for future use of dispute adjudication by Costa Rica.  
Also, there are times when the consequences of not filing a complaint 
far outweigh the high cost of filing. The Costa Rican government in the 
Underwear Case had an overriding desire to respond to the U.S textile 
safeguard measures because they risked losing 100 million dollars’ worth of 
trade.63 The situation of Ecuador further illustrates this point. Ecuador is one 
of the world’s largest banana exporters. During the famous EU (European 
Union) banana era, Ecuador incurred losses of more than 500,000 dollars a 
day. It rushed its accession to the WTO, in order to file a complaint against the 
EU on this issue; so as not to incur further losses.64  
Developing countries have also obtained relevant experience by joining 
a complaint that another state has already initiated. Peru did this in 1995 when 
it joined Canada and Chile to challenge an EU – labeling policy. It also 
received help from the Canadian government to pursue the case.65 After this 
first experience, Peru subsequently instituted a matter alone in a dispute that 
raised legal issues about labeling standards relative to Sardines.66 A mutually 
agreed solution was reached by the European Communities and Peru pursuant 
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to Article 3.6 of the DSU on the 25th of July 2003. Similarly, when the EU filed 
a complaint against the US on the issue of safeguards on steel imports, China 
joined as a party to the dispute three weeks later.67  Through this method, 
China was able to gain valuable experience on the WTO process. 
Relevant experience may also be gained by being a defendant in a 
WTO case.68 The situation of Indonesia illustrates this. A complaint was filed 
against Indonesia by the EU, United States and Japan in a dispute about its 
automobile policy in 1996.69 Two years later, Indonesia filed its first WTO case 
against Argentina about safeguard measures on footwear.70 In 48 years of 
membership in the GATT/WTO, Indonesia had never filed a case, but after 
this first case it went on to initiate two more, for a total of three in nine years.71  
The WTO DSU has also successfully resolved disputes through 
mediation as evidenced in the Thailand issue on Tuna Export to the EC 
(Formerly European Community now EU). The players in this case were 
Thailand and the Philippines on the one hand and the EC on the other. The 
initial challenge faced by Thailand was how to persuade the EC to enter into 
discussions on the matter. After this hurdle had been crossed, a formal letter 
requesting mediation was jointly submitted to the Director-General of the 
WTO. The matter was resolved amicably through mediation. This case is a 
good example of how developing country members were able to use their 
WTO rights to secure more equitable treatment from a developed country 
trading partner. Thailand’s Minister of Commerce, Adisai Bhodharamik, 
expressed it thus: 
… in resorting to the dispute settlement process, we did not seek 
to confront, but  opted for friendly persuasion and 
understanding. After all, the EC is one of our major trading 
partners, and a very important consumer not only of Thai tuna but 
in other sectors as well. We intended to avoid at all costs doing 
anything that would  jeopardize our long-standing and good 
relationship with the EU…72 
 
The arguments presented above posit that the WTO DSS has been 
effective in resolving developing countries’ trade disputes. Now let us examine 
the second argument that analyses the challenges and paradoxes experienced 
by developing countries in the WTO DSS.  
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4. CHALLENGES OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
INVOLVING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Nottage has identified significant problems that limit developing-country 
participation in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.73 He opines that a 
major constraint is that developing countries lack expertise in WTO law as well 
as sufficient resources to fund external WTO lawyers.74 Bown supports this 
position and argues that the WTO DSS is overly complicated and expensive; 
thereby making it extremely difficult for developing countries to overcome the 
human and financial resources that are expended in the process.75 The legal 
fees incurred in the Japan and United States case dealing with the issue of 
Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper was recorded by 
the Panel Report to be in excess of 10 Million US dollars.76 Indeed, this is an 
outrageous amount for a developing country (especially the relatively poor 
ones) to provide. Legal luminaries and world trade experts observe that the 
problem of high costs faced by developing countries is enhanced by their small 
trade shares and government budgets. They tend to have smaller aggregate 
trading stakes than their developed country counterparts.77 Although the DSU 
contains in Article 27.2 certain provisions that address the cost and resource 
constraints, it is submitted that the experts can only assist in respect of the 
dispute settlement and cannot provide legal advice before a dispute is initiated. 
Another fundamental problem with the WTO DSU is the auspicious 
fact that they are unable to appropriately enforce rulings through retaliation. 
Keen observers submit that developing countries with small domestic markets 
are unable to impose sufficient economic or political losses within the larger 
WTO members to generate the requisite pressure to induce compliance.78 The 
suspension of trade concessions or obligations may be more detrimental to the 
developing country than the non-complying member.79 This implies that there 
is little purpose in developing countries bringing WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings as they lack capacity to enforce rulings.80 The situation of Antigua 
and Barbuda in the 2007 dispute case against the United States succinctly 
exemplifies this scenario.81 In its request for retaliation, Antigua and Barbuda 
observed that ceasing all trade with the United States would have virtually no 
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impact on the US economy but would cause them untold hardship. The 
relatively low volume of trade (approximately 180 Million US dollars or 0.02 
per cent of all annual exports from the US) could easily be shifted elsewhere. 
Ecuador experienced a similar situation with the EC – Bananas III case.82 
Ecuador imports less than 0.1 per cent of total European Communities (EC) 
exports. The Arbitrator presiding on the dispute examined the ability of 
Ecuador to retaliate against the EC and stated thus: 
 
… given the fact that Ecuador, as a small developing country, 
only accounts for a negligible portion of the EC’s exports of 
these products, the suspension of  concessions is unlikely to 
have any significant effect on demand for these EC exports … in 
situations where the complaining party is highly dependent on 
imports from the other party it may happen that the suspension 
of certain concessions or certain other obligations entails more 
harmful effects for the part seeking suspension of concessions 
than for the other party …  
 
Developing countries are also deterred from using the WTO DSS 
because majority of them lack domestic mechanisms to identify and 
communicate trade barriers to WTO lawyers.83 Shaffer suggests that 
developing countries should request the assistance of development agencies 
and foundations to remedy this anomaly.84 Another prominent scholar opines 
that an independent Special Prosecutor or Advocate could be recruited to 
identify potential WTO violations on behalf of developing countries.85 
It is argued that another reason for developing countries’ reluctance to initiate 
WTO disputes is because they are afraid of political and economic pressures 
from the developed countries. Their vulnerability in areas such as development 
assistance and preferential market access makes them largely unable to counter 
threats to withdraw preferential tariff benefits or foreign aid.86 Although, one 
cannot provide practical scenarios of these pressures occurring, yet many 
developing countries perceive that such consequences might flow from their 
initiation of a WTO dispute.87   
Another major flaw with the WTO dispute mechanism according to 
Nottage, is the high proportion of developing-country trade occurring under 
preferential rules that are not part of enforceable WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings.88 A WTO member may enforce the rules under which it trades in 
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WTO dispute proceedings only if those rules are part of enforceable WTO law. 
The AB presiding over the United States Mexico dispute regarding Taxes on 
Soft Drinks confirmed that the WTO dispute system cannot be used to 
determine rights and obligations outside the covered agreements.89 
It has also been argued that the provisions of the S&D are inefficient in 
solving developing countries disputes. Lekgowe observes that Article 4(10) of 
the DSU that discusses Special Attention to the Problems of Developing 
Countries is fraught with numerous weaknesses. In his words; 
… The provision only urges and advises members to give special 
attention to the particular problems and interests of developing 
countries and therefore is not a mandatory provision. The 
provision is more declaratory than operative and does not 
provide any operative content, it does not state exactly who gets 
what assistance from whom. As a result, it does not create an 
enforceable obligation on the part of the members …90 
 
Lekgowe also contends that the provision for extension of time 
available to developing countries pursuant to Article 12 (10) DSU possesses 
overriding limitations. He submits that the advantage it carries is only available 
to a developing country that is a defendant; the extension of time is not 
available to a developing country that is a complainant.91  Also, the provision 
only applies to extension of time in respect of consultation time frames and 
not time frames at the implementation stage.92 
        
5. THE ROLE OF THE ADVISORY CENTRE IN DISPUTES 
INVOLVING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) is an independent inter-
governmental organization established in 2001 with the predominant aim of 
providing support, legal advice and training on WTO law. Their mission is to 
provide developing countries and ‘Least Developed Countries’ (LDCs) with 
the legal capacity necessary to enable them to take full advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the WTO.93 The ACWL’s legal services to developing 
countries are provided for free or at heavily subsidised rates. Their services are 
financed predominantly by developed countries endowment funds and 
developing countries contributions. Since July 2001 the ACWL has provided 
direct legal assistance in 38 WTO disputes and 5 cases through external legal 
counsels.94 Support is given in WTO panel, Appellate Body and 
implementation proceedings, and in reaching mutually-agreed solutions.95 The 
ACWL offers developing countries an opportunity to acquire experience that 
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goes beyond the legal representation of a private law firm.96 The centre 
provides access to low-cost legal opinions and also works closely with officials 
from home governments when litigating a dispute. 
The ACWL was criticized as being unable to provide non-technical 
inputs for developing countries required in WTO disputes.97 However, this 
concern has been addressed to a considerable extent.98 A technical expertise 
trust fund has been set up to subsidize the costs of contracting technical 
experts for developing countries. The Fund is financed by voluntary 
contributions of developed country Members. Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Norway have contributed to the Technical Expertise Fund.99 The fund has 
been used on several occasions to assist developing countries in acquiring 
scientific, economic and domestic law expertise presented in disputes.100 
Although the ACWL does not address all the constraints faced by developing 
countries in accessing the WTO DSS, it is argued that the ACWL’s 
intervention has greatly mitigated their lack of expertise in WTO law.101 
                   
6. POSSIBLE REFORMS OF THE WTO DSS 
The DSU mechanism is perceived to be of considerable benefit to developing 
countries. The shift from a ‘power’ to a ‘rules based’ system permits even the 
smallest and weakest economic powers to enforce the rules under which they 
trade and consequently provide unprecedented security and predictability in 
their trading relation.102 Although, a more balanced playing field has been 
achieved, developing countries still face difficulties in terms of resources and 
capacity to utilize the system effectively.103 It is respectfully submitted the DSS 
should be reformed. The DSS is somewhat slow and takes ages for a 
reasonable conclusion to be arrived at.104 The EU-Latin American Banana 
dispute which ended after 20 years of negotiations shows how slow the system 
can be. Although the ‘mutually agreed solution’ signed by the EU and Latin 
American countries consisted of 6 individual disputes;105 it is highly 
unacceptable and inexcusable for a trade dispute to take this long. Severe 
hardship would have undoubtedly been experienced by the developing 
countries concerned while the grievance complained of would have continued 
unabated.  
An accelerated mode of settling disputes needs to be adopted for 
future situations. 
Domestic systems to identify and communicate trade barriers to WTO lawyers 
should be improved upon. The current DSU review negotiations “do not 
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address this limitation to the effective use of the system for many developing 
countries.”106 Public-private networks to assist export sectors should be 
developed to communicate trade barriers to the government and to increase 
capacity building for conveying those barriers to WTO lawyers for legal 
assessment.107 
The scope of rules under which developing countries trade as part of the 
enforceable WTO law should be increased. The pertinent consideration should 
not be whether the developing countries should have preferential treatment, 
but where and in what form it would be most effective.108 
A permanent panel or body in the WTO would strengthen dispute 
settlement process. The present dispute system where panelists are on ad-hoc 
basis has led to problems. A permanent body will reduce the amount of time 
spent in constituting panels because panelists would now be readily available. 
So, the situation where panelists juggle from their home country to Geneva 
would be highly reduced, it will also lead to better dedication from panelists 
because they will now be employed on permanent basis rather than on ad-hoc 
basis. 
The major problem of developing countries is lack of legal assistance in 
WTO. The Advisory Centre on the WTO Law should be strengthened to 
provide quality legal assistance to developing countries. It was created in 2001 
to create a level playing ground for developing countries to be abreast of their 
rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement. The amount charged for 
this service may be too exorbitant for poor countries, legal assistance should be 
provided free to the poor countries who cannot afford it or in the alternative a 
trust fund should “be established to help finance the costs of retaining external 
experts.”109  
 The power of the DSB to accept panel and appellate reports should be 
stopped. In the DSB, there is a possibility that such report could be rejected. 
There is a likelihood of influence in the DSB, a powerful country can still block 
a report if it can muster the support of the other countries.  
 
7. CONCLUSION  
There is no generic answer to the question whether the WTO Dispute system 
has been effective in resolving the trade disputes of developing countries. To 
some experts, the DSS has failed the developing countries, whereas other 
experts aver that some developing countries have reaped benefits from their 
participation in WTO DSS. Also, in comparison with other similar 
international organizations, dispute settlement in the WTO can be considered 
to be successful. However, the largest bloc of members of the WTO, the 
African Group’s participation in dispute settlement has been negligible. Here, 
no African country has ever initiated a dispute under the DSU.110 African states 
constitute the majority of members of the LDC countries in the WTO. 
Bangladesh is the only LDC country that has initiated a dispute at the DSU 
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and the dispute did not go beyond the consultation stage of the DSM.111 Thus, 
until African states in the WTO attain increased participation in dispute 
settlement, the DSU and DSM should not be considered as being successful.112 
Opportunities and challenges for developing countries have occurred. 
It is opined that if meaningful steps are taken to reform the process in the ways 
suggested above, the DSS will become more attractive for developing countries 
to participate actively.  
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